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THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CIVIL 
COMMITMENT 
Andrew Scull* 
THE COURT OF LAST RESORT: MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE LAW. By 
Carol A.B. Warren with contributions by Stephen"J. Morse and Jack 
Zusman. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. 
1982. Pp. xii, 265. $25. 
On a sweltering day in London, towards the end of June, 1849, a 
curious throng of spectators jammed into a special sitting of the 
Court of the Exchequer to hear the Lord Chief Baron, Sir Frederick 
Pollock, and a special jury decide the case of Nottidge v. Ripley and 
another .1 For three days, the court remained "crowded to suffoca-
tion," while a still larger audience followed the proceedings at a dis-
tance, devouring successive installments of the real-life soap opera at 
breakfast, in the blow-by-blow account provided in the legal col-
umns of The Times. At the conclusion of the trial, after a brief retire-
ment, the jury found for the plaintiff, awarding her fifty pounds and 
costs. 
The object of this unwonted celebrity, Miss Louisa Nottidge, was 
a quiet and retiring "maiden lady . . . at the meridian of life," and 
her suit was an action for damages against her brother and brother-
in-law for wrongful confinement in a madhouse.2 As the trial testi-
mony revealed, shortly after her father's death, in May 1844, Louisa 
and three of her unmarried sisters ( all rather advanced in years) had 
become enamored of the doctrines of an obscure and tiny religious 
cult, the Lampeter Brethren, and of the preaching of the sect's 
leader, a defrocked Anglican curate named Prince. Within a matter 
of months, they had left their maternal home to follow Prince, taking 
with them their private fortunes - amounting to some six thousand 
pounds each. Three of the ladies promptly married, in the same cer-
• Professor of Sociology, University of California, San Diego. B.A., Oxford University; 
Ph.D., Princeton University. Professor Scull is the author of MUSEUMS OF MADNESS (1979), 
and the editor of MADHOUSES, MAD-DOCTORS, AND MADMEN (1981) and (with Steven Lukes) 
DURKHEIM AND THE LAW (1983). - Ed. 
I. Unless otherwise noted, my account of the trial is drawn from the daily law reports in 
The Times (London), June 25, 1849, at 7, col. 4; id, June 26, 1849, at 7, col. 2; id, June 27, 
1849, at 7, col. 4. 
2. The meagerness of the damages she received was sharply criticized in some quarters. 
See, e.g., The Times (London), June 30, 1849, at 5, col. I. Apparently the jury was reluctant to 
impose heavier damages because they believed that the defendants were not actuated by mer-
cenary or other improper motives. 
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emony, much younger (and penniless) members of the religious 
commune, not troubling to take the usual Victorian precaution of 
protecting their property through pre-nuptial settlements. Louisa, 
apparently unable to find even so unsatisfactory a suitor, neverthe-
less joined her sisters in Agapemone, or the Abode of Love, the 
country house which the sect now occupied in Somerset. 
Here she lived for six weeks with the other fifty or sixty members 
of the commune, "dazzled by its luxury, charmed with its games and 
pastimes, and sustained by glorious assurances of judgment being 
past, and heaven to come;"3 till at length her mother learned of her 
whereabouts. Convinced that her daughter "was not a free agent," 
that her mind was deranged, and that her continued presence in this 
den of sin and iniquity was "endangering her happiness in this and 
her welfare in a future life," Mrs. Nottidge determined to rescue her 
from such "a low, degrading, and disgusting association." Accord-
ingly, she dispatched her son and son-in-law to Somerset. Gaining 
access to the house by stealth, they first tried to persuade Louisa to 
come with them to visit her sick mother. When she declined, how-
ever, they seized her, "dragged her out of the house, notwithstanding 
her struggles and screams, and forced her into a carriage without 
either bonnet, or shawl, or shoes . . . and then off they drove as fast 
as the horses could put their feet to the ground." Two medical men 
were readily found to certify that her reckless disregard of her repu-
tation and property, and her peculiar religious beliefs - or delu-
sions, as they were now held to be - constituted clear evidence of 
insanity, and she was promptly carted off to Dr. Stillwell's mad-
house, Moorcroft House. 
The spectators at the trial listened to this gothic tale with rapt 
attention, occasionally mixed with gales of laughter when revelations 
of the goings-on at the Abode of Love provided a measure of comic 
relief. Miss Nottidge had remained under confinement for some 
fourteen months, still insisting that Prince was "God manifest in the 
flesh," that the day of judgment had come, and that she had been 
rendered immortal and should shortly "be taken up to heaven in the 
twinkling of an eye" - and still diagnosed by the asylum superin-
tendent and by the Lunacy Commissioners, the official inspectors of 
all asylums, as a religious monomaniac. Then she managed to es-
cape. She was rapidly recaptured and brought back to the asylum, 
but not before she had succeeded in alerting her co-religionists to her 
whereabouts. After a protracted struggle, they secured her release 
(at which point, she promptly returned to Agapemone and handed 
over all her assets to Prince). 
The medical witnesses at the trial were uniformly convinced that 
3. J. CONOLLY, A REMONSTRANCE WITH THE LORD CHIEF BARON, TOUCHING THE CASE 
OF NOITIDOE V. RIPLEY 16 (1849). 
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Louisa Nottidge had been and still was deranged, and thus in need 
of protection and treatment in an institution. Their lay audience was 
not persuaded. As The Times put it in its editorial on the case: "We 
must not stretch a harmless hallucination into legal insanity. . . . 
The shades and gradations of error and folly are so insensibly 
blended that we could not incarcerate and coerce such an [sic] one 
without danger to others, . . ."4 And in summing up the evidence 
for the jury, the Lord Chief Baron all but directed a verdict for the 
plaintiff: "It is my opinion that you ought to liberate every person 
who is not dangerous to himself or others ... and I desire to im-
press that opinion with as much force as I can."5 
Periodic moral panics over the issue of the improper commitment 
of the sane to asylums were endemic in the nineteenth century in 
both England and the United States, and attempts like Pollock's to 
limit the criteria justifying involuntary commitment to the narrowest 
possible compass reflect one possible response to these spasms of 
anxiety.6 But alienists fiercely resisted attempts to constrict the defi-
nition of madness within such narrow confines, and for the most part 
they succeeded. In theNottidge case, the Lord Chief Baron's dictum 
drew forth an impassioned critique from John Conolly, the leading 
authority of his generation in matters psychiatric.7 
Notwithstanding its "apparent conformity . . . to the liberty of 
the subject, and to the dictates of humanity,"8 argued Conolly, the 
attempt to restrict the asylum population to lunatics who were a dan-
ger to themselves or others was thoroughly mistaken and 
mischievous: 
If the liberty of an insane person is inconsistent with the safety of his 
property or the property of others; or with his preservation from dis-
graceful scenes and exposures; or with the tranquility of his family, or 
his neighbours, or society; - if his sensuality, his disregard of cleanli-
ness and decency, make him offensive in private and public, 
dishonouring and injuring his children and his name; - if his exces-
sive eccentricity or extreme feebleness of mind subject him to continual 
imposition, and to ridicule, abuse, and persecution in the streets, and to 
frequent accidents at home and abroad; - his protection and that of 
society demands that he should be kept in a quiet and secluded resi-
dence, guarded by watchful attendants and not exposed to the public.9 
Similarly, with young women "of ungovernable temper,. . . sullen, 
4. The Ti.mes (London), June 30, 1849, at 5, col. 1. 
5. The Times (London), June 27, 1849, at 7, col. 5. 
6. On the issue of improper confinement in the nineteenth century, see generally McCand-
less, Liberty and Lunacy: The Victorians and Wrongful Confinement, in MADHOUSES, MAD-
DocroRS AND MADMEN 339-362 (A. Scull ed. 1981). 
7. On Conolly, see Scull, A Brilliant Career? John Conolly and Victorian Psychiatry, 24 
V1cr. Snm. _ (1984) (forthcoming). 
8. J. CONOLLY, supra note 3, at 5. 
9. Id at 7. 
796 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:793 
wayward, malicious, defying all domestic control; or who want that 
restraint over the passions without which the female character is 
lost." 10 and young men ''whose grossness of habits, immoderate love 
of drink, disregard of honesty, or general irregularity of conduct, 
bdng disgrace and wretchedness on their relatives; . . . People of 
this kind may not endanger their lives or those of others, but their 
being at large is inconsistent with the comfort of society, and their 
own welfare; . . ."11 ''To forbid the placing of such persons in asy-
lums because they are not dangerous. . . . would be to forbid their 
being protected and cured,"12 and furthermore would "bring afflic-
tion on a thousand families, and even throw society into confu-
sion."13 The case of Louisa Nottidge was of exactly this sort: "[I]t 
belonged to a class in which the patient is unequal, from feebleness 
and unsoundness of mind, to take care of herself or her prop-
erty; . . . "14 Confinement preserved "her money . . . from legal-
ized robbery, and her person from the possibility of legalized 
prostitution . . . ."15 Consequently, "[t]hose who exult in her liber-
ation from the salutary control of an asylum are exulting over her 
ruin."16 
While perhaps shrinking from endorsing the full measure of 
Conolly's attempt to equate insanity with any deviation from con-
ventional social and moral standards, it is clear that over the next 
century and more, the civil commitment codes of all Anglo-Ameri-
can jurisdictions by and large embraced the claims made by psychia-
trists to be the arbiters of the boundary between sanity and insanity. 
These laws accepted the need for a broad standard for commit-
tability, based on the state's paternalistic interest in securing protec-
tion and treatment for the loosely defined class of the mentally 
unbalanced. Sir Frederick Pollock's attempt to narrow the criteria 
for individual commitment, although symptomatic of a widespread 
distrust of psychiatrists' character and competence,17 had only a lim-
ited impact on the development of mental health law. 
Beginning in the late 1960's, however, in the context of a virtual 
explosion of law and litigation in the United States relating to the 
mental health system, there has been a marked trend away from 
traditional commitment codes, with their typically loose standards 
10. Id. at 9-10. 
11. Id. at 9. 
12. Id. at 12. 
13. Id. at 9. 
14. Id. at 12. 
15. Id. at 18. 
16. Id. at 13. 
17. See, e.g., McCandless, supra note 6,passim. 
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and protections and broad grants of discretionary authority. 18 One 
of the earliest and most influential manifestations of this trend was 
the passage of a new commitment law in California, widely known 
as the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS).19 Under LPS, the empha-
sis in involuntary commitment decisions shifted away from a parens 
patriae concern with "protecting" those unable to care for them-
selves, towards a much greater stress on the issue of danger to others 
and on procedural rights. Commitment for anything more than an 
emergency 72-hour period could be achieved in only two ways: (1) 
through a conservatorship subject to mandatory yearly judicial re-
view and jury trial for those persons found to be "gravely disabled" 
- that is, on the basis of clear and convincing evidence, mentally 
unable to provide for their "basic personal needs for food, clothing, 
or shelter"; or (2) through commitments lasting no more than ninety 
days for persons who are mentally ill and who, as evidenced by re-
cent overt acts, attempts, or threats of violence, are found to be "im-
minently dangerous." Such 90-day commitments can only be 
renewed if it is shown that the patient, while confined, again acted 
violently. Under either standard of commitment, the person alleged 
to be mentally ill has the right to be notified of all proceedings 
against him or her and to be present at all hearings; and the right to 
be represented by an attorney during all judicial review proceed-
ings.20 Thus, the California commitment law in a number of crucial 
respects now corresponds quite closely to the standard articulated in 
Nottidge v. Ripley; indeed, from some points of view, it is even 
stricter. 
Carol Warren's new book, The Court ef Last Resort, presents a 
wide-ranging analysis of court i:idministration of this new mental 
health law. The book's particular focus is an empirical examination 
of judicial decisionmaking about whether to release or retain those 
involuntarily committed under LPS, based on extensive first hand 
research and observation in "Metropolitan Court" (a pseudonym for 
a Los Angeles mental health court). Though she attempts to place 
her findings in a broader sociological context, to see courtroom deci-
sions as to some degree conditioned by large-scale economic, polit-
ical, and historical forces, the results of this effort are rather thin and 
insubstantial.21 The book's real strength lies in its documentation of 
18. See generally, A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 
(1974); D. WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH LAW: MAJOR lsSUES (1981); Wexler, The Structure of 
Civil Commitment, 1 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 1 (1983). 
19. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§§ 5000-5464 (West 1972). On the passage of LPS, see E. 
BARDACH, THE SKILL FACTOR IN PoLmCS (1972). 
20. For a review of commitment law in California, including some subsequent modifica-
tions ofLPS, see Estate of Hofferber, 28 Cal. 3d 161,616 P.2d 836, 167 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1980). 
21. For example, her discussion in Chapter Seven of decisionmaking by the court on 
habeas corpus writs is hampered rather than helped by a clumsy and heavy-handed attempt to 
structure the analysis around an examination of certain abstract "theories" of the decision-
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the gap between the formal wording of the statute and the practical 
application of the law and in its contribution to the current debate 
about the appropriate standards for involuntary commitment. 
The Metropolitan Court Routine 
Theoretically, LPS sets up an adversarial system in the court-
room, designed ( on an analogy with an idealized portrait of the 
criminal justice system) to protect the patient's rights. Lawyers seek-
ing commitment confront other lawyers representing those alleged to 
be in need of confinement, and psychiatric personnel face question-
ing and cross-examination about the grounds for their conclusions. 
In practice, however, as Warren demonstrates in a variety of con-
texts, the norm is rather one of cooperation and mutual accommoda-
tion among a group of actors who routinely play out the same roles 
day after day, and who have all developed a working consensus 
around a "commonsense" model of madness (p. 138). The practical 
effect of a common culture and a set of shared organizational imper-
atives is a recognition that ''we all work together here" (p. 140) and a 
conviction that such a state of affairs is both natural and desirable. 
Thus, though courtroom procedures are dominated by elaborate 
rituals designed "to demonstrate compliance with procedural rules 
as well as with substantive law" (p. 147), public defenders "generally 
refrained from vigorous advocacy of their clients' legal rights under 
LPS" (p. 165). Instead, they chose to work "together with the other 
participants in the hearing to come to what all could agree was the 
'right decision' for the individual and for society" (p. 172). Notwith-
standing an apparent conflict between "the medical and legal frames 
of reference," the practical convergence on "an underlying common-
sense and a taken-for-granted perspective on mental illness" 
smoothed the way for an easy and tension-free collaboration. Just as 
"attorneys view their clients as crazy and therefore refrain from 
standing firmly in the way of their involuntary incarceration" (p. 
140), so too the psychiatrists - mostly state hospital personnel who 
appear regularly in the same courtroom - adapt readily to "legal 
practices" and to the existence of "a stable release rate" (p. 191). 
The judge, meanwhile, justifies "the smooth, rapid, and routine 
method of processing" in the courtroom, and 
the lack of an adversary approach to justice in mental health law on 
the grounds that the role of the defense attorney was to be 'a reflection 
of the client's personality' rather than a vigorous advocate. If the client 
was crazy, then this should not be concealed by the defense attorney. 
[P. 191]. 
As Warren notes, this emphasis on assembly line justice closely cor-
making process (conflict, legal, organizational, and individual decision-maker) and their sup-
posed implications. 
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responds with the pattern that obtains in the criminal courts - on 
whose allegedly "adversarial" procedures the reformers who wrote 
LPS modeled the new law.22 
Where outside intervention in the system threatens this pattern of 
mutual accommodation, the main actors in the carefully staged 
drama move quickly to minimize its impact. Thus, in the face of the 
challenge posed by potentially disruptive higher court rulings, the 
judge, district attorneys, public defenders, and mental health coun-
sellors, "members of the organization cooperating as a whole - em-
barked on a search for a legal way to evade the problems attendant 
upon [implementation]" - as one participant put it, " 'tinkering 
with' the new precedent until it 'came out right'" (p. 189). A more 
frequent source of disturbance was the arrival of a "new, aggressive, 
advocate defense attorney," full of idealism, intent on implementing 
the letter of the law and defending the "rights" of his clientele (p. 
195). Such callow youths were quickly disabused, and most ''would 
learn the ropes, and would become socialized to the way things are 
done" (p. 195). The occasional nonconformist aroused anger and 
then protective action: Mr. Simmons, for example, refused to "settle 
down." Instead, 
he persuaded a number of his conservatee clients to ask for jury trials, 
thus tying up Department 2 for days on end. He also spent hours stud-
ying and arguing on habeas corpus hearings, committing what was 
probably the most egregious organizational faux pas, talking at length 
to clientele. Unlike his predecessors, Mr. Simmons did not modify this 
behavior over time, let alone cease and desist. After a few weeks, the 
judge became angry. . . . Bill Simmons was fired from his job after 
about three months; when I asked another public defender why, he 
replied, "Oh, that guy- because he was stupid." [Pp. 195-96]. 
As this suggests, while the formal requirements of the law do, to 
a limited extent, constrain decisionmaking, they are far from deter-
mining outcomes. For example, "long-term commitment based on 
the need for care and treatment, the standard overturned by. LPS, 
has been restored through the use of conservatorships" (p. 43). Pa-
tients admitted on an emergency 72-hour hold as "dangerous" are 
subsequently relabeled as "gravely disabled" (p. 40), in part because 
of the difficulty of demonstrating dangerousness. Indeed, the LPS 
provision allowing a ninety-day commitment on grounds of danger 
to others "is almost never used in California" (p. 27). Moreover, 
[g]rave disability standards dealt less with food, clothing, shelter, and 
finances - functioning within the community- than with functioning 
inside the family and the mental health system. This suggests that con-
22. See generally, Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a 
Public Defender Office, 12 Soc. PROBS. 255 (1965); Rovner-Pieczenik, Labeling in an Organiza-
tional Context: Adjudicating Felonies in an Urban Court, in THE REsEARCH EXPERIENCE (M.P. 
Golden ed. 1976). 
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siderations of individual rights and the protection of society are dis-
placed in this court by considerations of the relief of family tensions 
and the smooth functioning of the mental health system. [P. 175]. 
Perhaps even more ironic, conservatorship hearings under LPS take 
even less time than the five minute average prior to the act, "the 
statistic which had prompted legislative interest in involuntary civil 
commitment in the first place" (p. 42). 
In the courtrooms Warren studied, therefore, "decision making is 
particularistic, situational, and arbitrary rather than universal and 
fair;- medical theories posture as proven facts, and organizational 
needs take precedence over legal and psychiatric requirements" (p. 
211). And there is every reason to believe that this is not an atypical 
pattern. At the very least, this should caution us to be wary of be-
coming caught up in abstract debates on the issue of civil commit-
ment, and to be skeptical about the practical impact of any given set 
of "reform" proposals. Still, of course, it scarcely renders irrelevant 
the question of what in principle constitutes appropriate grounds for 
involuntary commitment, and Warren's book devotes considerable 
space to precisely this issue. 
The Debate Over Abolition 
At one extreme, in recent years a small but vocal minority has 
urged that compulsory commitment is never justified, so that "[t]he 
goal [of mental health policy] should be nothing less than the aboli-
tion of involuntary hospitalization."23 Such proposals have attracted 
a considerable following among the legal community, though their 
most visible and tireless proponent has been the renegade psychia-
trist, Thomas Szasz, for whom "[i]nvoluntary mental hospitalization 
is like slavery. Re.fining the standards for commitment is like pretti-
fying the slave plantations. The problem is not how to improve com-
mitment, but how to abolish it."24 The antithesis to this position, 
from one perspective, is the extraordinary array of behaviors and 
conditions John Conolly urged us to accept as justifications for in-
voluntary commitment in his Remonstrance over theNottidge v. Rip-
ley case25 - except that few would now def end such a stance, at 
least in public. Realistically speaking, therefore, the alternative to 
abolitionism turns out to be a much more limited, eclectic, and qual-
ified defense of compulsory commitment, which urges involuntary 
hospitalization as preferable, on balance, to the likely alternatives. 
In The Court of Last Resort, these two competing positions are 
defended with considerable zeal by Stephen Morse (pp. 69-109), a 
23. B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY 232 (1972). 
24. T. SZASz, THE SECOND SIN 89 (Anchor Books ed. 1972). 
25. J. CONOLLY, supra note 3; see text accompanying notes 8-16 supra. 
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lawyer and psychologist,26 and Jack Zusman (pp. 110-113), a psy-
chiatrist, with Warren joining in to argue for the retention of certain 
forms of involuntary commitment. Morse's arguments for the aboli-
tionist position closely resemble those previously developed by 
Thomas Szasz,27 and rest upon a shared commitment to the overrid-
ing importance of what they both term "liberty"28 - though it 
should be noted at the outset that Morse's brief is less overtly polem-
ical and consciously eschews the vituperative tone, name-calling, 
and attribution of base motives to one's opponents in which Szasz 
seems to revel. As one would expect from a skilled attorney, the 
abolitionist position is persuasively made, with logic and force that 
threaten to demolish the opposition's more cautious eclecticism. By 
contrast, Zusman and Warren's uneasy compromises among com-
peting values, and rueful confessions of both psychiatrists' limita-
tions and the dangers inherent in the exercise of parens patriae 
powers, give their arguments a necessarily more vulnerable and 
compromised appearance. 29 And yet, I shall suggest that in the :final 
analysis, it is precisely the moral absolutism of Morse's position that 
is its decisive weakness, rendering "it impotent to calculate the com-
plex relations between means and ends, risks and benefits which 
hold in real lif e."30 
Morse notes that ''the deprivation of liberty authorized by invol-
untary commitment laws is among the most serious restrictions on 
individual freedom the state may impose," and that, unlike incarcer-
ation for criminal acts, "it may be imposed on the basis of predic-
tions, without the prior occurrence of legally relevant behavior such 
as dangerous acts" (p. 72). He begins his assault on this practice by 
denying the validity of the widespread belief in our culture that the 
irrational behavior of the mentally ill is compelled, while the behav-
ior of "normal" people is freely chosen. Recent social scientific re-
search has indeed cast some doubt on this belief, as a blanket 
contention, demonstrating that in some contexts, in certain restricted 
ways, the psychotic can exercise a measure of control over their be-
26. A fuller version of this argument appears in Morse, A Preference far Liberty: The Case 
Against the Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally .Disordered, 10 CALIF. L. REV. 54 (1982). 
27. See T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963); Szasz, Involuntary Psychiatry, 
44 U. CIN. L. REv. 347 (1967). 
28. For analysis and critiques of this term as used by Szasz, see P. SEDGWICK, PSYCHO· 
POLlTICS 149-184 (1982); Goldstein, The Politics of Thomas Szasz: A Sociological View, 21 
Soc. PROBS. 570 (1980). 
29. The plausibility of Zusman's contribution is further undermined by his reliance upon 
the highly dubious claim that the commitment process is now sufficiently adversarial to "en-
sure" that the weaknesses underlying psychiatric opinion will be adequately considered, p. 
116, a contention that, as we have seen, files in the face of the evidence presented elsewhere in 
Warren's book. 
30. P. SEDGWICK, supra note 28, at 154. 
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havior.31 Indeed, from the early nineteenth century to the present, 
control of inmate behavior within the mental hospital has perforce 
rested on precisely this presumption "that it made some sort of sense 
to hold the lunatic responsible for his actions, and that by doing so 
his behaviour could be manipulated."32 Morse seizes on this evi-
dence. The mentally ill, he contends, "often . . . have as much con-
trol over their behavior as normal persons do;" and ''we cannot be 
sure that the person was incapable, as opposed to unwilling, to be-
have rationally or to control him or herself' (p. 75, emphasis in orig-
inal). Moreover, ''the assertion that the irrationality or other 
behavior of mentally disordered persons is compelled . . . is a belief 
that rests on common sense intuitions and not on scientific evidence" 
(p. 75). 
But these are disingenuous arguments. "Often" is a very long 
way from always, and few observers would dispute that much 
psychotic behavior remains uninterpretable in any ordinary sense as 
intentional behavior. Indeed, we cannot be sure that a madman's 
actions were uncontrollable, but it may well be more sensible (f. e., in 
accordance with the preponderance of the evidence) to act on that 
presumption than to assume that he was capable of control and treat 
him accordingly. And of course the claim that action is free or deter-
mined ultimately rests on common sense intuitions and not science: 
how could it be otherwise when (as Morse himself concedes but a 
few moments later) "empirical evidence cannot definitely prove or 
disprove that anyone has or lacks free will" (p. 75, emphasis added)? 
But what Morse neglects to note is that we may have very good 
grounds indeed for this common sense presumption. 33 
Moreover, were we to adopt Morse's position, we would be com-
mitted to holding "nearly all persons, including crazy persons, re-
sponsible for their behavior'' (p. 100). Necessarily, then, we would 
have no grounds for objecting if substantial numbers of discharged 
mental patients were to end up in prison. To his credit, Morse does 
not try to duck this issue: instead, he meets it head on, asserting that 
this result is "more respectful of the dignity and autonomy of crazy 
persons" than the alternative of confining them in a mental hospital 
(p. 101). One cannot help admiring his audacity, even as one is dis-
mayed by the Orwellian use of language. Fortunately, despite the 
advent of 1984, we do not all (yet) inhabit a Humpty-Dumpty world 
in which "a word . . . means just what I choose it to mean - neither 
31. See, e.g., B. BRAGINSKY, D. BRAGINSKY & K. RING, METHODS OF MADNESS: THI! 
MENTAL HOSPITAL AS A LAST REsORT (1969). 
32. A. SCULL, MUSEUMS OF MADNESS 202 (1919);seeolso E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 361-62 
(1961). 
33. See generally, J. COULTER, APPROACHES TO INSANITY (1973). 
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more nor less."34 And until we do, it is unlikely that many ofus will 
view consigning someone to jail as anything but a singularly odd 
way ofrespecting his dignity and autonomy.35 Of equal importance, 
while Morse may not balk at the prospect of sending the mentally ill 
to prison, a common law system of justice built around the concept 
of criminal responsibility almost certainly will.36 Zusman is thus as-
suredly correct when he points out that "to eliminate state control as 
a preventive measure and allow the mentally ill to be accountable 
for any law-breaking and mistakes, is completely unacceptable with-
out a massive shift in law and public opinion." On the other hand, it 
is equally plain that "[c]omplete disregard of rule breaking by the 
mentally disordered - that is, freedom to do whatever they please 
without any consequences - is a politically unacceptable alterna-
tive" (p. 132). 
Morse's second argument against involuntary commitment is that 
the mental health system "is unlikely to identify accurately those 
persons who should arguably be committed" (p. 73). He is on much 
stronger ground here. The tendency of psychiatrists to overpredict 
dangerousness is pervasive and (given the structural pressures oper-
ating on them) both unsurprising and unlikely to change.37 Thus, 
legitimizing commitment on the basis of dangerousness necessarily 
involves accepting that a high proportion of those preventively de-
tained would not in fact have behaved violently: the most authorita-
tive available review suggests that inaccurate predictions will range 
as high as sixty or seventy percent.38 Unquestionably, such statistics 
should give anyone pause. Whether they should also lead us entirely 
to abandon "dangerousness" as a ground for involuntary commit-
ment is, however, more debatable. There is the obvious objection 
about the political possibility ( or rather impossibility) of such a 
move (p. 127). But quite apart from these purely practical concerns, 
the question remains as to whether we ought to wait until the pre-
dicted harm occurs (if indeed it does) before we attempt to intervene. 
For those who share, with Morse, an absolute and overriding com-
mitment to "liberty" - conceived of as a presocial attribute of atom-
ized individuals - no dilemma exists.39 By contrast, if liberty is 
34. L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 123 
(Peter Pauper Press ed. 1941). 
35. See J. JACOBS, STATEVILLE (1977). 
36. Compare the discussion in Wexler, supra note 18, at 11-14. 
37. On these pressures, see generally T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL (1966); Shah, Dan-
gerousness: A Paradigm far Exploring Some Issues in Law and Psychology, 33 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 224 (1978). 
38. See J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981). 
39. Note Morse's confession that "even if a commitment system could be devised that ac-
curately identified very crazy and clearly dangerous people and limited commitments to those 
who could be successfully treated only in a hospital. • . I would still oppose involuntary com-
mitment." P. 96. 
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seen as a vital, but not always controlling value, and as an inextrica-
bly social phenomenon,40 decisionmaking becomes much more com-
plex, with no ready-made and all-embracing solution. One is forced 
to recognize, for example, that the social costs (including the costs to 
the liberty of a sizable number of other people)41 imposed by the 
continued presence in society of a seriously disruptive and poten-
tially violent crazy person (to use Morse's terminology) may be so 
great as to justify commitment, even if more than half the time the 
threat of violence remains merely a threat. The choices here are ob-
viously very difficult; but I suspect that the best pragmatic resolution 
is to follow Monahan and Wexler's42 suggestion, and require an in-
verse relation between the probability and the seriousness of the 
harm, so that the greater the harm predicted, the lower the 
probability of its occurrence needs to be in order to justify involun-
tary commitment. 
What of those "who are mentally unable to fend for themselves" 
(p. lll) and who need to be confined for their own good? Morse 
denies that such cases exist: 
Of course, there are cases of disordered persons that seem to cry out for 
intervention: the delusional person who seems on the verge of a violent 
outburst or who appears to be destroying the fabric of his or her fam-
ily; or the terribly disorganized person whose life is apparently in jeop-
ardy because the person seems unable to cope with minimal food, 
shelter, clothing, or medical needs; or the person in the throes of a 
manic episode who appears to be jeopardizing a career or reputation; 
or, perhaps most compellingly, the person on the verge of suicide who 
appears clearly to be making a mistake in judgment about his or her 
own helplessness and the hopelessness of his or her life situation. [P. 
97, emphasis added]. 
Not to worry, they only seem that way: Morse has "an intuitive 
hunch" that "even the craziest person has substantial control over 
his or her behavior;" and if that does not seem sufficiently persua-
sive, he reminds us that crazy persons, like the rest of us, possess "an 
inalienable right to liberty" (p. 97). 
Doubtless, the inalienable right to liberty must have been a great 
comfort to the severely impaired 89-year-old woman whom Warren 
observed, slowly starving to death in her home, wandering around a 
room with "barely a sign of habitation. . . . bumping into things 
and alternately mumbling softly and shouting phrases from frag-
40. "Freedom is an achieved, not an inherent condition: it is to be measured by the devel-
opment of the individual's powers in self-determination, not assumed to exist as an all-or-
nothing quality whatever one does." P. SEDGWICK, supra note 28, at 176. 
41. See Sainsbury & Grad de Alarcon,Evaluatinga Service in Sussex, in ROOTS OF EVAL• 
UATION 239 (1973); Yarrow, Schwartz, Murphy & Deasy, The Psychological Meaning of Mental 
Illness in the Family, I I J. Soc. lssuEs 12 (1955). 
42. Monahan and Wexler,A J)ejinite Maybe: Proof and Probability in CM! Commitment, 2 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37 (1978). 
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ments of a past life" (pp. 28-29). Or to a Mrs. Simmons, of whom 
counsel testified: 
She was found on the floor of her apartment, where she had not gotten 
up for three months. She was malnourished. Maggots had eaten away 
part of her leg. She cannot be moved from the hospital until her leg is 
healed and she gains some weight. A neighbor had fed her on the floor 
for three months. She was lying in her own feces for three months. [P. 
29]. 
In the future, if such persons "really" disliked their situations, why 
then, they could always exercise the "autonomy" Professor Morse 
had so sedulously and kindly preserved for them when he blocked 
their involuntary commitment. 
On the whole, I think we ought to prefer the common sense view 
that among the things people like this lack is autonomy, even if, as 
Morse is quick to remind us, such perceptions rest on "little more 
than an intuitive hunch" (p. 97). Indeed, since the contrary view 
seems more than a trifle perverse, one wonders what can have led 
intelligent and thoughtful persons to adopt it. In part, the answer 
seems to lie in a continuing attachment to the Szaszian position that 
mental illness is simply a "myth."43 As Warren points out, sociology 
made its own distinctive contribution to this belief that "mental ill-
ness was merely a matter of labeling of undesired behaviors and 
persons" (p. 5), and Morse, like others skeptical of psychiatry's 
pretentions, seems to have adopted substantial portions of this analy-
sis. Hence his preference for "crazy'' rather than "mentally ill," "be-
cause it is more descriptive and carries fewer connotations about 
disease processes that beg important questions about self-control" (p. 
73 n.3); and his penchant for minimizing the distinctiveness of the 
psychotic and the claims to expertise of their custodians, the 
psychiatrists. 
For almost a quarter of a century, an intense and often acrimoni-
ous debate has raged about the medical model and the appropriate 
conceptualization of mental disorder, with no agreement yet in 
sight.44 But whatever the final outcome of the controversy, it surely 
cannot alter the social reality that there exists a substantial number 
of people - be they victims of endogenous disease processes or of 
"problems in living" - who lack basic social capacities and who 
manifest extreme helplessness and dependency. Moreover, while I 
share the assessment that on balance the data at our disposal "sug-
gest that expert psychiatric knowledge is a well-managed 'appear-
43. T. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (rev. ed. 1974). 
44. For a defense of medicine's claims, see generally J. WING, REAsoNING ABOUT MAD-
NESS (1978); for alternative views see Ingleby, Mental Health and Social Order, in SOCIAL 
CONTROL AND THE STATE: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE EsSAYS 141 (S. Cohen & A. Scull 
eds. 1983); Morgan, Explaining Mental Illness, IS EUR. J. Soc. 262 (1975); Sedgwick, Mental 
Illness Is Illness, 20 SALMAGUNDI 196 (1972). 
806 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:793 
ance of objectivity' rather than a set of 'objective facts,' "45 I would 
suggest that this provides an argument for lessening the role of 
doubtfully "expert" testimony in the commitment process, not for 
abolishing commitment altogether.46 Nor do I think that the evi-
dence supports Morse's attempts to play down the damage associ-
ated with psychosis, an essential prop for his contention that 
commitment is "a simple, although unfair, answer to interpersonal, 
family, and comparatively mild social problems" (p. 81, emphasis 
added). In this connection, it is surely significant (though of course 
in no sense conclusive) that Carol Warren, who began her observa-
tions in "Metropolitan Court" sharing this assumption "as an article 
of faith (although I saw it then as sober scientific reasoning, not be-
lief)" (p. 51), found herself compelled by what she experienced to 
recognize the existential reality of "mental disorder . . . indepen-
dent of labeling" (p. 202) and the necessity for compulsory 
hospitalization. 
Care, Treatment, and Liberty 
Morse is certainly correct, however, to worry about the poten-
tially repressive consequences of allowing people to be confined "for 
their own good." As Conolly's remarks on theNottidge case demon-
strate,47 the range of behaviors that might render one subject to such 
intervention (in the eyes of at least some psychiatrists) has in the past 
been extraordinarily wide: adolescent rebelliousness, harmless ec-
centricity, violation of conventional standards of morality or of sex-
ual propriety, extreme carelessness with one's money or property.48 
It is this, I suspect, that has prompted the claim that "psychiatric 
opinions are essentially political judgments."49 Yet the fact that "be-
nevolent" concern for the welfare of others has served to legitimize 
egregious violations of some people's freedom does not invalidate 
the claim that there are occasions when we may indeed be justified in 
intervening in others' lives "for their own good." 
It may be objected, however, that mental hospitals "rarely cure, 
nor do they decrease the stigma" (p. 89). Worse, "even in 'advanced' 
states that supposedly maintain the best services" all too often one 
encounters "revelations of. . . inadequate and sometimes inhumane 
care and treatment" (p. 92). Again, there is a good deal of truth to 
45. S. PFOHL, PREDICTING DANGEROUSNESS 230 (1978), 
46. This, incidentally, is also the conclusion Pfohl reaches, S. PFOHL, supra note 45, at 228-
230, and Morse himself agrees that involuntary commitment decisions could be taken on 
grounds independent of "the vagaries, unreliability, and internecine disputes of mental health 
science." P. 84 n.12. 
47. See text accompanying notes 8-16 supra. 
48. For recent examples, see R. LEIFER, IN THE NAME OF MENTAL HEALTH (1969); Ennis 
& Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693 (1974). 
49. S. PFOHL, supra note 45, at 229. 
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both claims, though once more I shall suggest that this does not com-
pel us to embrace Morse's chosen alternative of abolishing involun-
tary confinement. 
The critique of the mental hospital's structural deficiencies has a 
very long history.50 In the late nineteenth century, for example, neu-
rologists - then in the process of constituting themselves as a medi-
cal specialty - provoked a bitter internecine conflict with 
institutional psychiatry by urging the asylum's total unsuitability for 
the treatment of mental disorders.51 A long series of exposes by 
muck-raking journalists provided further ammunition for the mental 
hospital's critics.52 And, most notably of all, a mass of social scien-
tific research in the 1950's and 1960's was devoted to the elaborate 
documentation of the irredeemable deficiencies of what Erving 
Goffman dubbed "total institutions."53 
Such apparently objective findings have been widely dissemi-
nated, serving as one of the major ideological supports for the move-
ment to deinstitutionalize the mental hospital population. 54 In the 
process, mental hospitals have been stigmatized as inevitably provid-
ing a disabling, counter-productive environment, one which exacer-
bates any pre-existing pathology through an "organizational tyranny 
[calculated to produce] the thwarting of human possibilities."55 Un-
questionably, the historical record demonstrates that most mental 
hospitals have more closely resembled warehouses for the storage of 
the unwanted than institutions providing treatment and cures.56 But 
this is a far cry from the more extravagant claims made by Goffman 
50. See A. SCULL, DECARCERATION: COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND THE DEVIANT: A 
RADICAL VIEW 105-133 (2d ed. 1984). 
51. See Blustein, ''.A Hollow Square of Psychological Science'~· American Psychiatrists and 
Neurologists in Conflict, in MADHOUSES, MAD-DOCTORS AND MADMEN,supra note 6, at 241-
270; Scull, The Social History of Psychiatry in the Victorian Era, in id at 17-20. 
52. The most famous of this genre is Albert Deutsch's THE SHAME OF THE STATES (1948); 
for a more up-to-date example, see W. RAWLS, COLD STORAGE (1980). 
53. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 32, at 4; see also R. BARTON, INSTITUTIONAL NEUROSIS (2d 
ed. 1965); I. BELKNAP, HUMAN PROBLEMS OF A STATE MENTAL HOSPITAL (1956); A.H. STAN-
TON & M.S. SCHWARTZ, THE MENTAL HOSPITAL: A STUDY OF INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPA-
TION IN PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS AND TREATMENT (1954); R. PERRUCCI, CIRCLE OF MADNESS: 
ON BEING INSANE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED IN AMERICA (1974). 
54. See Scull, The Decarceration of the Mentally Ill· A Critical View, 6 POL. & SocY. 173 
(1976); see also Rose, Deciphering Deinstitutionalization: Complexities in Policy and Program 
Analysis, 51 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 429 (1979). 
55. Perry, The Two Cultures and the Total Institution, 25 BRIT. J. Soc. 343, 353 (1974). 
56. G. GROB, MENTAL ILLNESS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 1875-1940 (1983); D. ROTHMAN, 
THE DISCOVERY OF THE AsYLUM (1971); D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: 
THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980); G. GROB, MENTAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA: SOCIAL POLICY TO 1875 (1973); A. SCULL,supra note 32; Walton, 
The Treatment of Pauper Lunatics in Victorian England· The Case of Lancaster Asylum, 1816-
1870, in MADHOUSES, MAD-DOCTORS AND MADMEN, supra note 6, at 166; Tomes,A Generous 
Co'!fidence: Thomas Story Kirkbride's Philosophy of Asylum Construction and Management, in 
id at 121. 
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and his epigones. It is these more extreme ".findings" that Morse and 
others rely on when they urge us to abolish involuntary hospitaliza-
tion altogether; and yet the research which purports to document 
these effects is so methodologically flawed and empirically inade-
quate57 that one must seriously question the wisdom of depending 
upon it. 
Of at least equal significance in the present context, those social 
scientists who have criticized the mental hospital have almost en-
tirely neglected to consider what the alternatives to it are, preferring 
to make the bland (and untested) assumption that "the worst home is 
better than the best mental hospital."58 In practice, this has proved 
to be a tragically mistaken belief. A growing volume of research59 
has demonstrated that community "care" for the chronically crazy is 
in fact community neglect, and that "the effective meaning of liberty 
for the involuntarily committed is social marginality, deprivation, 
and despair" (p. 203). So far from being the grand reform of mental 
health care its ideologues have proclaimed, the practical implemen-
tation of community treatment has created "a system which, daily 
and quietly, harms and kills the sick."60 
At least Morse recognizes that the problem exists: "The condi-
tion of many 'deinstitutionalized' ex-patients in the community is a 
national disgrace" (p. 95). But he immediately seeks to evade its 
implications: 
One should not compare the all-too-questionable benefits of hospitali-
zation to complete or near-complete neglect in the community. The 
only fair comparison is to community living and treatment where soci-
ety meets its moral obligations rather than cynically avoiding them. [P. 
100].61 
51. See McEwen, Continuities in the Study of Tota/ and Non-Total Institutions, 6 ANN, REV, 
Soc. 143, 147-148 (1980); Scull, The Asylum as Community/ The Community as Asylum: Para-
doxes and Contradictions of Mental Health Policy in, MENTAL ILLNESS: CHANGES AND 
TRENDS 329 (P. Bean ed. 1983). 
58. E. CUMMING & J. CUMMING, CLOSED RANKS (1957). 
59. A. DAVIS, s. DINITZ & B. PASAMANICK, SCHIZOPHRENICS IN THE New CUSTODIAL 
COMMUNITY (1974); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE COMMU· 
NITY: GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO Do MORE (1977); UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON 
AOINO, THE ROLE OF NURSING HOMES IN CARINO FOR DISCHARGED MENTAL PATIENTS 
(1976); Emerson, Rochford & Shaw, Economics and Enterprise in Board and Care Homes for 
the Mentally Ill, 24 AM. BEHAv. SCIENTIST 771 (1981); Kirk & Thierren, Community Mental 
Health Myths and the Fate of Former Hospitalized Patients, 38 PSYCHIATRY 209 (1975); Rose, 
supra note 54; A. SCULL,supra note 50; Scull,A New Trade in Lunacy: The Recommod!ftcation 
of the Mental Patient, 24 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 741 (1981); Scull, .Deinstitutiona/ization and 
the Rights of the .Deviant, 31 J. Soc. Issues 6 (1981); Warren, New Fonns of Social Control· 
The Myth of .Deinstitutionalization, 24 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 724 (1981); Wolpert & Wolpert, 
The Relocation of Released Mental Patients into Residential Communities, 1 POLY. SCI. 31 
(1976). . 
60. P. SEDGWICK, supra note 28, at 229-230. 
61. In parallel fashion, Morse insists on comparing the reality of a psychiatric commitment 
process (focusing especially on the most egregious misuses of "expertise") with a wholly ideal-
ized portrait of the law as a routinely adversarial system offering clear-cut and uncompromis-
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I find this an astonishing claim. Such a comparison is "fair" only in 
the sense that it supports the argument Morse is advancing - but at 
the unacceptable price of leaving behind the social realities we must 
confront. Discharged mental patients do not live in a society that 
"meets its moral obligations." The alternatives they (and we) must 
face are inadequate and underfunded mental hospitals or a grossly 
underdeveloped and often nonexistent system of community care. 
Here the choices are tougher and the answers less clear-cut than 
those Morse provides us with; but they have the distinct merit of 
being the real ones. And when we confront them, I think we must 
conclude, as Warren does, that for a substantial proportion of the 
chronically crazy, 
care in a profit-making institution at a cost of$14.50 a day seems more 
treacherous and less human than care in a state institution at $31 a day. 
And the confines of the state hospital, for the dispossessed, seem to 
threaten effective liberty less vitally than the sidewalks, streets, and 
cheap hotels of the completely homeless. [P. 207, citation omitted].62 
To suggest that the mental hospital is sometimes a defensible -
indeed preferable - solution to the problems posed by mental disor-
der, and to argue that compulsory commitment is also an option we 
should retain, is not to deny the need to place a sharp check on psy-
chiatric enthusiasms and to be properly skeptical of many of the 
claims psychiatrists advance. The legal system undoubtedly has an 
important role to play here. Yet we must beware lest we succumb 
equally blindly to legal enthusiasms, since these are no less capable 
of leading us astray. Indeed, when we debate the merits and demer-
its of compulsory commitment, we ought constantly to bear in mind 
that 
the real scandal of contemporary public psychiatry is not the particular 
section of the mental-health statutes under which patients get into hos-
pitals, but the alternatives offered to these supremely weak members of 
society by our present social arrangements both inside and outside the 
mental institution.63 
ing protections of individual rights. That our legal system bears only the most superficial 
resemblance to his picture of it seems to discomfort him not one whit. But those who come 
before the courts populate the real world, and not this theoretical heaven. One must compare 
reality with reality, not with some pretty fantasy that better suits the case one wants to make. 
62. See also J. RUBIN, EcONOMICS, MENTAL HEALTH, AND THE LAW (1978); Borus, lJein-
stitutionalization ef the Chronically Mentally Ill, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 339 (1981). 
63. P. SEDGWICK, supra note 28, at 180. 
